Technology adoption in follower countries can be accomplished by local R&D activities, but it can also be achieved without formal R&D, for example, by foreign direct investment. Empirical evidence suggests that current R&D activities often expand local knowledge for future R&D, while adoption without R&D does not seem to have this effect. We formalize this idea in a quality-ladder growth model and find that this biased externality results in multiple steady states: In the long run, countries with sufficient initial knowledge and human capital converge to a state in which R&D is locally undertaken and thus become relatively rich, while other countries fully rely on technology adoption without R&D and stay poor. Switching regression using cross-country data supports the presence of multiple steady states in R&D expenditures.
Introduction
Follower countries lagging behind the world technology frontier 1 can benefit greatly from adopting foreign advanced technology. Technology adoption can be accomplished by local R&D activities, which are often undertaken by local firms that have licensing agreements with foreign firms and by multinational enterprises (MNEs) of frontier countries with research laboratories in the host country. In addition, follower countries can adopt new technology without engaging in formal R&D. In practice, the main contribution to this form of technology adoption may be made by MNEs without an R&D unit in the host country. These two forms of technology adoption, one with local R&D and the other without R&D, correspond to adoption with inventive and minor adaptation to local circumstances, respectively, as Evenson and Westpal (1995) argue.
Differences between the two forms of technology adoption have been discussed in the literature, particularly by comparing licensing and foreign direct investment (FDI). Kim and Ma (1997) and Lall (2000) suggest from experiences of East Asian countries that although production workers in MNEs can achieve operational capabilities, they cannot understand the principles of technologies. By contrast, R&D activities associated with licensing enable local workers to learn the knowledge of licensers. The knowledge then spills over to other engineers through labor turnover, subcontracting, and formal and informal discussion. Additionally, Todo and Miyamoto (2002) find, using Indonesian firm-level data, that the productivity of local firms is positively correlated with the magnitude of R&D-performing FDI but uncorrelated with the magnitude of non-R&D-performing FDI. These observations suggest that local R&D associated with either licensing or FDI expands local knowledge of the economy, whereas FDI without local R&D does not.
Because of this difference between the two forms of technology adoption, long-run levels of technology and output in a follower country may be largely determined by whether it relies on adoption with or without R&D. Yet, few theoretical works have examined this issue, although many focus on a particular type of adoption, such as imitation through local R&D as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) , and FDI as in Findlay (1978) , Walz (1997) , and Fosfuri et al. (2001) , rather than comparing two types of adoption. Although other studies such as Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Glass and Saggi (2002) incorporate two channels of technology transfer, FDI and licensing, they do not focus on the difference between these two channels in terms of the promotion of local knowledge. The model of Glass and Saggi (1999) combines FDI and imitation, but FDI is exogenous. Saggi (1999) incorporates different effects of FDI and licensing on local knowledge, assuming that knowledge spills over from licensing but not from FDI. However, because Saggi's model is a two-period duopoly game, it does not provide a long-run implication.
Therefore, this paper incorporates technology adoption both with and without R&D into a quality-ladder growth model based on Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Aghion and Howitt (2005) , examining how the magnitude of each form of adoption is determined and how the relative usage of the two forms affects the long-run output level. Given the empirical evidence above, the crucial assumption of the model is that current R&D activities expand local knowledge and hence the productivity of future R&D, whereas technology adoption without R&D does not affect local knowledge.
Our model generates two major results. First, there may be multiple steady states, depending on initial conditions. If initial endowments of skilled labor and knowledge are sufficiently large, follower countries increasingly depend on adoption with R&D as they catch up with frontier countries, and they converge to a steady state in which the level of local R&D is positive. By contrast, if the endowment of local knowledge or human capital is small, follower countries converge to a steady state in which there are no local R&D activities, or in practice, in which there are only non-R&D-performing FDI. The output level is higher in the former state than in the latter.
The reason for this result is that there is a dynamic externality in technology adoption with local R&D but not in adoption without R&D. Because of this biased externality, current R&D may generate a virtuous cycle. However, countries with limited knowledge or human capital cannot benefit from the virtuous cycle, because gains from current R&D are limited.
This externality leads to the second major result that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. Because private firms are unaware of the externality, they underinvest in R&D activities. Therefore, subsidies for R&D could increase output per capita in the long run. In some cases, R&D subsidies could cause a dramatic shift from convergence to a zero-R&D state to convergence to a positive-R&D state.
The idea of multiple steady states in dynamic models has a long history. In particular, the model of this paper is close to Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1991) in that they assume two sectors, as this paper assumes two forms of technology adoption, in one of which production is characterized by increasing returns to scale while the other has a constant-returns-to-scale production function.
Further, we test the presence of multiple steady states in R&D expenditures by using cross-country data. Employing the switching regression model with unobservable regime change developed by Quandt (1972) and introduced to the growth literature by Bloom et al. (2003) , we find that the theoretical predictions are mostly supported: Depending on its endowments of human capital and knowledge, each country tends to converge to either a positive-or zero-R&D steady state.
Since large R&D expenditures are likely to correspond to large income per capita, this result is consistent with Bloom et al. (2003) , who found two types of steady state in terms of income per capita in cross-section of countries. In addition, it is consistent with Bloom et al. (2002) who find evidence of variation in the steady-state levels of countries' total factor productivity (TFP), although they focus on geography and institutions as the major determinants of TFP levels, rather than, as in this paper, endowments of human capital and local knowledge. The role of human capital in choosing one among multiple growth processes is also identified in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) who find, estimating a nonlinear equation, that TFP growth for a country is either faster or slower than the leader country depending on its level of human capital. Multiple income-growth processes are also found in Quah (1993) and Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003) who use Markov-chain transition models.
Our findings have implications for development policies. Until recently, FDI had been considered as the major source of technology transfer (Ito and Krueger, 2000, for example) . Accordingly, many studies have empirically tested for the effect of FDI on growth, including Borensztein et al. (1998) , Sjöholm (1999) , Haskel et al. (2002) , among many others.
2 However, this paper suggests that, although promoting FDI is beneficial to productivity improvement, it may not lead to expansion of local R&D even in the long run. Thus, encouraging local R&D together with FDI should have a larger effect.
3
Note that some East Asian countries that have achieved rapid growth have adopted such policies. For example, the governments of Japan and Korea encouraged licensing in the early stages of their development (Kim and Ma, 1997) , and the Chinese government currently requires MNEs in some sectors, 2 Saggi (2002) and Keller (2004) provide comprehensive surveys of the issue. 3 Some other theoretical studies also suggest that promoting FDI may have limited effects on growth in less developed countries. The reasons include the absence of learning in MNEs (Wang and Blomström, 1992) , minimal linkages between MNEs and local firms (RodriguezClare, 1996) , and substitutability between FDI and imitation (Glass and Saggi, 1999) .
such as automobiles, to set up R&D units in China (Yusuf, 2003) .
4 Also, this policy implication accords with the argument of Yusuf (2003) that East Asian countries that have absorbed much knowledge through FDI need more local R&D for further growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model, and Section 3 shows the equilibrium analysis. The empirical evidence is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
The model developed in this paper is a simple extension of a quality-ladder growth model such as those in Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Aghion and Howitt (2005) . This is a discrete-time model with overlapping generations starting from period 1. We focus on a small follower country that has a relatively low level of initial knowledge and adopts new technology exogenously developed at the world knowledge frontier.
Production
There are two types of worker, skilled and unskilled, in the follower country. Skilled workers refer to those with a high level of education, or human capital. Each worker lives for two periods, and the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in each generation are constant and are denoted by H and L, respectively. Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor in the first period of her life and retires in the second period.
The final good is produced competitively using a continuum in the 0-1 interval of intermediate goods according to the following production function:
where A t (i) and x t (i) are the quality and quantity of intermediate good i used in period t, respectively, and α ∈ [0, 1]. The final good is fully consumed by either the "young" or "old" generation in each period, and its price is unity. Unskilled labor engages in intermediate-good production, while skilled labor improves the quality of intermediates. Specifically, each of intermediate firms produces one unit of its product from one unit of unskilled labor. The market for each intermediate good is monopolized by a firm that improves the product quality using skilled workers and thus receives patents for the good of that quality. We assume that each patent lasts for only one period and that any firm can produce any good of a quality that was achieved in the previous period because of costless intranational knowledge diffusion. Therefore, the monopoly of the incumbent firm would be eliminated in the next period without further quality improvement. Additionally, we assume that costs of quality improvement for the incumbent firm are always smaller than those for any other firm, because of the incumbent's knowledge from its previous experiences. Accordingly, the incumbent firm in the initial period in each intermediate sector will engage in further quality improvement and monopolize the entire market in any period, as long as the profit from quality improvement is positive, as will be true in equilibrium under certain conditions.
Quality Improvement
Each intermediate firm can improve the quality of its product by technology adoption using skilled labor. Since there are two forms of technology adoption, one with local R&D activities and the other without R&D, each firm chooses the levels of the two.
We assume two differences between the two forms, following the argument in the Introduction. First, adoption without R&D does not require local knowledge in the follower country, while the degree of quality improvement by adoption with R&D is positively associated with the local knowledge level. Second, current local R&D activities raise the productivity of future R&D by expanding local knowledge, whereas technology adoption without R&D does not.
More specifically, we assume that the quality of intermediate good i is given by
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation represents quality improvement without R&D.Ā t−1 is the quality level at the world knowledge frontier in period t − 1, which is the same for all intermediate goods and grows at an exogenous rate g > 0:Ā t = (1 + g)A t−1 . Part of this frontier quality can be introduced through technology adoption without local R&D. 5 This type of adoption requires local skilled labor as managers, rather than engineers, who learn production processes and new operational techniques from foreign manuals. H M t (i) denotes the number of these skilled workers in sector i in period 5 Although firm i could be a MNE as we argued in the Introduction, this model does not explicitly consider international flows of capital.
t. Because the degree of quality improvement is an increasing function of the number of skilled workers employed, we specifically assume
whereH is the total amount of skilled labor engaged in innovation at the world frontier, which is exogenously given, and µ ∈ (0, 1).
6 Note that the degree of quality achieved by this channel does not depend on the knowledge level of skilled workers, because their task, reading manuals, does not require a high level of knowledge.
The second term denotes quality improvement through local R&D activities. This type of technology adoption requires skilled labor as engineers as well as a combination of local and frontier knowledge for local R&D. H R t (i) is the number of skilled workers engaged in local R&D, and we assume
where ρ ∈ (0, 1). A t−1 , defined as the frontier quality in period t − 1, also represents the knowledge level of the frontier countries in period t, whereasÃ t−1 represents the knowledge level of local skilled workers in period t.
7 Constant parameter φ ∈ (0, 1) represents the weight for local knowledge.
Each skilled worker shares the same local knowledge because of costless knowledge diffusion within the country. However, because the local knowledge does not expand through technology adoption without local R&D, its level is not equal to the total quality level achieved in the previous period,
Instead, it should be represented by the quality level achieved by local R&D as follows:
GivenÃ t−1 andĀ t−1 , the monopoly firm producing good i maximizes its profit from production less the cost of quality improvement in period t:
where w L t and w H t are the wage rates of unskilled and skilled labor in period t, respectively. The price of good i, p t (i), is a function of x t (i) as a result of the profit maximization in the final-good sector.
Consumption
Both skilled and unskilled workers are risk neutral, and the discount rate of any worker is r. In the middle of period t, each young worker born in that period receives her wage and consumes. She may save part of her wage and purchase shares of intermediate firms at the end of period t for future consumption. In the middle of period t + 1, shares of each firm yield dividends, which are equal to the monopoly profit given by equation (4). After that, old consumers sell all their shares to the young generation and consume the quantity of the sum of the dividends and the value of their shares.
This symmetry combined with 1 0
Also, we obtain the relation between H R t and the quality level of the follower country relative to the world frontier, a t ≡ A t /Ā t :
where
, and X indicates the first-order derivative of any function X. Further algebra yields the following difference equation with respect to H R t for period t ≥ 2:
The initial condition, H R 1 , is given by
This implies that H R 1 increases as a 0 , the initial relative knowledge level that is exogenously given, rises.
Quality improvement generates a non-negative profit if (6) and equations (17) and (18) in Appendix A to rewrite this yields L > H/
The fact that the maximum value of the right-hand side of this inequality is either µ or ρ generates the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (Profitability of Quality Improvement) All firms producing intermediate goods engage in quality improvement in every period if
This proposition states that if the number of production workers, and hence the size of the market, is sufficiently large, quality improvement generates a non-negative profit. We assume that these conditions are met throughout this paper.
The equilibrium of the model can now be formally defined.
Definition 1. (Dynamic and Steady-State Equilibrium)
The dynamics of H R t in equilibrium are determined by equations (7) and (8) (7) in the case of the steady state as:
where The key assumption that leads to the presence of multiple dynamic patterns and steady states is the biased dynamic externality that exists in technology adoption with local R&D but not in adoption without R&D. If the externality is unbiased, i.e., if the local knowledge expands through any type of adoption and henceÃ t−1 = A t−1 , there is only one stable steady-state equilibrium regardless of parameter values and initial conditions.
In case (i), the parametric condition holds when the weight assigned to local knowledge in quality improvement through local R&D, φ, is sufficiently small. This implies that the dynamic externality in local R&D is relatively weak, and hence there is a unique steady state in this case as in the case with no externality.
In case (ii), the externality in R&D is sufficiently large. Hence, a higher current knowledge level results in a larger employment level in R&D and hence even larger future knowledge. This leads to a virtuous cycle in R&D and convergence to a positive steady-state level of R&D. By contrast, if the follower country's knowledge level is initially low, it chooses not to engage in R&D in the long run because gains from R&D are not sufficiently large. This argument can also be applied to case (iii) under any initial condition.
Among two steady states in case (ii), the positive-R&D state is associated with a higher output level than the no-R&D state, according to equation (5) and da t dH
where X denotes the second-order derivative of any function X, derived from equation (6). However, the growth rates of the average quality and output converge to g in the long run in any case, because a constant a t in steady state implies that A t andĀ t grow at the same rate. Finally, we present another proposition that will be used in the empirical analysis. 
Case (ii): 1 and H Case (iii): 1 and H
Proof is provided in Appendix C. Diminishing marginal products of skilled labor in technology adoption should have resulted in these scale effects in levels, as Jones (1998) discusses.
R&D Subsidies
In this model with two types of worker, it is not easy to define a social utility function for welfare analysis. Thus, we consider the welfare issue of whether subsidizing (or taxing) local R&D activities raises quality and output per capita in the steady state. Since all output is consumed at each period and consumers are risk neutral, an increase in total output unambiguously raises the welfare of any consumer. Denoting the rate of the subsidy to wages of skilled workers engaged in local R&D activities by τ , we rewrite equation (6) as
Accordingly, the dynamics of H R t are given by
and its steady-state value is implicitly given by
where the function q is defined by equation (9). with it, the subsidy can make a drastic shift from converging to a zero-R&D steady state to converging to a positive-R&D state.
Case (iii) can be divided into two subcases when an R&D subsidy is provided. First, if (1 − τ ) 
(
1 and
H H
with R&D subsidies remains the zero-R&D state even when the subsidy is provided. We refer to this as case (iiib). In cases (i), (ii), and (iiia), differentiating equations (11) and (13) with respect to τ yields
This and the fact that ∂a ∂H R > 0 if τ < φ derived from equation (11) The reason for the efficiency gains from an R&D subsidy is again the biased dynamic externality. Since private agents do not appropriate the future gains from current R&D, they underinvest in R&D activities in the decentralized equilibrium. Since φ represents the weight of local R&D in quality improvement, an economy where the weight of R&D is larger needs a larger R&D subsidy to achieve the maximum output.
Empirical Analysis
This section tests the main prediction of the model presented in Proposition 2, the presence of multiple steady states in local R&D.
Data
For this empirical investigation, we need proxies for the variables in the model. First, the number of skilled workers engaged in R&D activities, H R , is represented by the R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP, denoted as R&D.
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These data come from UNESCO (1999). 8 In practice, R&D activities utilize capital in addition to labor, although it is not assumed in the model. To incorporate this, we use R&D expenditures, rather than the number of workers engaging in R&D, to represent H. 9 The updated version is available at http://www.unesco.org. The data set includes only the ratio of R&D expenditures to GNP, rather than GDP.
Second, the total magnitude of skilled labor in the economy, H, is represented by the share of workers with a secondary-school degree or higher educational qualifications, which we hereafter call educated workers, in the total labor force. This is proxied by the proportion of people with a secondary-school degree and above in the population aged 25 years and above from Barro and Lee (2001) . 10 We use the share of educated workers, rather than their number suggested by Propositions 2 and 3, because a huge variation in their number across countries should lead to a biased result. Also, one may derive another conclusion that the share of skilled workers influences the equilibrium of the model by assuming that the number of intermediate goods produced in each country is proportional to the size of its total labor force.
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Finally, the follower country's average quality relative to the frontier level, a, is represented by the level of TFP relative to that of the United States. Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) , the TFP of each country in year t is defined as
where Y t , K t , andL t are real GDP, real capital stocks, and the number of workers, respectively, in year t andᾱ = 1/3. Y s andLs are from the Penn World Tables (PWT) Version 6.1 that update Summers and Heston (1991) . Observations on K t are obtained from K t = I t + (1 − δ)K t−1 where I represents investment taken from the PWT and δ, the depreciation rate, is 0.06. We assume K 1970 = I 1970 /(g I + δ) where g I is the average growth rate of investment between the first year with available data and 1970. s is average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2001) . κ(s) indicates effective units of each worker, in which we assume κ = 0.134 for s < 4, κ = 0.101 for 4 ≤ s < 8, and κ = 0.068 for s ≥ 8, on the basis of micro evidence from Psacharopoulos (1994). Aiyar and Dalgaard (2004) find that this methodology is "a very good approximation to a more general formulation under which countries have different aggregate production functions which do not require a constant elasticity of substitution between factors."
We collect these data for forty-nine countries for which they are available for the period 1980-1999 to generate a panel data set covering two 10-year periods. The sample does not include the United States, which is assumed to 10 Although the share of educated people in the total population aged 15 years and above is also available in the Barro-Lee data, we use the share in the total population aged 25 years and above, since the population aged 15 and above includes people currently studying in school. Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) also use the share in the population aged 25 and above to represent the level of human capital.
11 This is a standard assumption to eliminate scale effects in growth that is used in Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch.12), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) , Peretto (1998), and Young (1998) . See Jones (1998) for detailed discussion on this issue. be at the world technology frontier. The ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP is the average over each 10-year period, while the TFP level and the share of educated workers from the beginning of each period are used to represent initial conditions. Since R&D data are missing on some countries for some years, the R&D ratio may be based on only a few annual observations, rather than on all ten. The data are presented in the Appendix Table.
Estimation Methods
Proposition 2 suggests that countries with large endowments of human capital and knowledge converge to a positive-R&D steady state, whereas others converge to a zero-R&D state. In practice, the latter is likely to correspond to a state with only FDI but without R&D.
Figure 3 presents broad empirical support for these results. In this figure, one segment shows changes in FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 12 and R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP from the 1980s to the 1990s for each country. One end of a segment with a country code denotes averages for the 1980s, while the other without a code denotes averages for the 1990s. Countries are divided into four groups according to the TFP level and the share of educated workers in 1980.
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The bottom left figure of Figure 3 indicates that in most countries with low initial TFP and human capital, such as Costa Rica (country code, CRI) and Indonesia (IDN), FDI inflows increased whereas R&D expenditures remained low or declined. Among the twelve countries in that group, only two, India (IND) and Malaysia (MYS), raised R&D expenditures, while the increases were marginal in magnitude. By contrast, the top right figure shows that R&D expenditures in all countries with high TFP and human capital increased from a high level to an even higher level, except for those in Netherlands (NLD), the United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). Thus, the figures generally indicate that there are two types of country depending on the levels of TFP and human capital, as the theory predicts.
Furthermore, we test the theoretical predictions by using formal regression analysis.
14 The difficulty is that the data do not clearly distinguish between 12 The data on FDI inflows are taken from UNCTAD (2003), and GDP data are from the World Bank (2003) .
13 Fifty countries including the United States are first divided evenly according to their TFP levels in 1980. Each of the two groups of countries is then divided according to their shares of educated workers in 1980. As a result, each group includes twelve or thirteen countries.
14 The author gratefully acknowledges discussion with and suggestions from Yasuyuki Countries with high TFP and low human capital the two types of country. Although one approach is to classify countries by the growth rate of R&D expenditures, this exogenous division may not reflect the true difference between the countries. Therefore, this paper uses the switching-regression model with unobservable regime change developed by Quandt (1972) and introduced to the growth literature by Bloom et al. (2003) . Specifically, the empirical model is constituted by the following three equations.
where z * is a latent variable, and
where t − 1 and t denote variables in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively, ∆ ln R&D it ≡ ln R&D it −ln R&D i,t−1 , and ξ, ε and ν are error terms. Equation
Sawada that were helpful in developing this idea and running the regression.
(14) indicates that countries are classified according to their endowments of human capital and knowledge. Equation (15) represents the dynamics of R&D expenditures for the type of country that converges to a positive-R&D steady state, while equation (16) represents the dynamics for the type of country that converges to a zero-R&D steady state.
The results of the model imply the following predictions for the coefficients of the equations. First, Proposition 2 suggests that countries converging to a positive-R&D steady state should have sufficiently large endowments of human capital and knowledge. Therefore, we expect η 1 > 0 and η 2 > 0 , since under these conditions, countries with large levels of a i,t−1 and H i,t−1 are likely to have a positive z * it and hence follow equation (15). Second, the standard convergence argument suggests γ 1 < 0 and ζ 1 < 0. Third, because a larger endowment of human capital, H, leads to a larger level of R&D in the positive-R&D steady state according to Proposition 3, we expect γ 2 > 0. Similarly, although R&D expenditures are always zero in the zero-R&D steady state, an increase in the endowment of human capital shifts up the curve Figure 1 in any case and hence lowers the speed of converging to the zero-R&D state. Thus, we also expect ζ 2 > 0. Finally, equation (15) implies that the share of R&D expenditures in GDP in the positive-R&D steady state for country i is given by exp (−(γ 0 + γ 2 ln H i )/γ 1 ) , which is expected to be positive. However, its value in the zero-R&D steady state, given by exp (−(ζ 0 + ζ 2 ln H i )/ζ 1 ) , should not be statistically different from zero.
We estimate equations (14), (15), and (16) jointly by maximizing the loglikelihood given by Dickens and Lang (1985) :
where Φ and φ are the normal cumulative and density distribution, respec-15 For the baseline initial values of the coefficients in equations (15) and (16), σ εε and σ ζζ , we first use the OLS estimates in which we assume no regime change. For the baseline initial values of the coefficients in equation (14), we use the results from a probit regression, assuming z = 1 when the growth rate of R&D expenditures is positive and z = 0 otherwise. Then, we set two other initial values around the baseline value for each coefficient or variance. After estimating the switching regression model using all combinations of the initial values, we choose the result with the largest likelihood.
tively, and σ kh is the covariance of error terms k it and h it . σ ξξ is normalized to equal one.
Although our approach is similar to that of Bloom et al. (2003) , their empirical model is regression of levels of income per capita whereas ours is regression of the growth in R&D expenditures. This is because we assume that the R&D ratio to GDP does not reach its steady state in many countries. In addition, although Bloom et al. (2003) avoid to use endogenous variables as regressor, this paper uses the share of educated workers and the TFP level, which are likely to be endogenous. However, using lagged regressors should alleviate the potential endogeneity problem.
Results
Column (1) of Table 1 reports the results from a simple maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in which we assume no regime change, 16 while columns (2), (3), and (4) indicate the results for equations (14), (15), and (16), respectively. The likelihood ratio statistic from the values of the likelihood functions of the two models is 40.65, rejecting the null hypothesis that the model without regime change is the true specification.
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The positive and significant coefficients of a i,t−1 and ln H i,t−1 in equation (14) reported in Column (2) indicate that countries with high levels of initial knowledge and human capital are likely to converge to a positive R&D state, as the theory predicts. Using these estimated coefficients, we can compute the probability of converging to a zero-R&D steady state for each country according to
The last column of the Appendix Table reports this probability using data for the year 2000.
18 We find a probability of eighty percent or more for eleven countries, 19 in all of which, except for Columbia, R&D expenditures relative to GDP in fact declined or remained at a low level according to Figure 3 and the Appendix Table. Also, these coefficients suggest that, evaluated at the average relative TFP level, 0.789, and the average share of educated workers, 34.2 percent, a tenpercent increase in the relative TFP (i.e., to 0.868) lowers the probability of converging to the zero-R&D state by 0.13. Similarly, a ten-percent increase in the share of educated workers (i.e., to 37.6 percent) lowers it by 0.05.
The role of human capital in choosing one among multiple growth processes has also been found in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) , while there are several differences between their and our methods. First, their focus is on TFP growth, rather than growth in R&D expenditures. Second, they estimate a nonlinear equation to test for the presence of multiple growth processes, rather than employing a switching regression model. 20 20 Our model suggests that growth in TFP for countries converging to a zero-R&D state is still faster than growth in frontier countries because of technology adoption without R&D. This is consistent with that Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) classify almost all countries, including all the forty-nine countries in our sample, as countries with faster TFP growth The coefficients of ln R&D in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 are negative and significant, supporting convergence in the long run. The estimated coefficient of ln H is positive and significant in column (4) as predicted, while it is insignificant in column (3) and contradicts to the theoretical prediction. Despite this contradiction, the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP in the steady state computed from the results is consistent with the theory. Using the average share of educated workers, the ratios are 3.00 percent and 0.59 percent in the positive-and zero-R&D steady states, respectively, as presented in the second row from the bottom of Table 1 . Wald statistics reported in the last row indicate that the point estimate for the positive-R&D state is significantly different from zero at the five-percent level, whereas the estimate for the zero-R&D state is insignificant. Furthermore, the point estimate for the positive-R&D state is close to the actual figure for the United States in the 1990s, 2.6 percent.
As a robustness check, we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and use the share of educated workers in 1990, rather than the share in 1980. The use of the share in 1980 may have alleviated possible endogeneity problems but may have led to another problem, because it increased substantially during the than the leader. period examined. The results reported in Table 2 are qualitatively the same as and quantitatively similar to the previous results, except for the insignificant effect of a in column (2). In conclusion, the empirical results mostly support Proposition 2.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the choice of follower countries on the use of local R&D activities when they adopt foreign advanced technology and effects of that choice on the long-run output level. In practice, adoption without R&D is often undertaken by MNEs, while adoption with R&D by either MNEs with R&D units in the host country or local firms that have licensing agreements with foreign firms.
We assume a biased dynamic externality in local R&D in the sense that current R&D improves the productivity of future R&D, whereas technology adoption without R&D does not improve it. This assumption leads to the presence of multiple steady states. While countries with large endowments of local knowledge and human capital converge to a steady state in which there is a positive level of local R&D, countries with small endowments depend only on technology adoption without R&D in the long run. Moreover, because of the externality in R&D, subsidizing R&D is most likely to increase the long-run output per capita.
Cross-country data was used to test the presence of multiple steady states in R&D expenditures by the switching-regression approach with unobservable regime. The empirical results generally support the theoretical predictions, although some results are not statistically significant.
Finally, possible extension of the analysis of this paper is suggested. First, although the size of educated labor is exogenously given in the model, the decision of each worker on whether she receives higher education should be endogenous. Incorporating this may strengthen the presence of multiple steady states, because investment in education is likely to be more profitable in a country with a higher level of local knowledge. Second, the number of observations in our cross-country data set is only forty-nine, which is relatively small to estimate thirteen unknown parameters. Alternatively, we may use industry-level data for multiple countries such as those in OECD or firm-level data for a particular country to test the presence of multiple steady states in R&D.
where v t (i) is the value of the total shares of intermediate firm i in period t. We can rewrite this as
Since π t (i) for any t ≥ 1 and any i is fully determined by the solution to the producers' maximization problems and r is exogenous, v t (i) and thus consumption of the young and old generations can be determined accordingly. In other words, the no-arbitrage condition together with the equilibrium level of H R t given by equations (7) and (8) yields the consumption level, whereas determining the dynamics of H R t does not require the no-arbitrage condition. This result is different from results in the standard quality-ladder growth models such as Aghion and Howitt (1992) , where the no-arbitrage condition is required to determine the level of R&D, because of the following two reasons. First, because each incumbent firm at the initial period has cost advantages in quality improvement by assumption and thus continues to monopolize the market in any subsequent period, the free entry condition does not hold: the cost of quality improvement does not necessarily equal the value of each firm. Second, because patents last for only one period and thus each incumbent firm engages in quality improvement in any period, the one-time profit for each firm equals the sales less costs of inputs for production and quality improvement given by equation (4). Accordingly, the amount of skilled labor employed in R&D is determined by the maximization of the one-time profit, rather than by dynamic decisions, although the value of each firm is dynamically determined by the no-arbitrage condition.
B. Derivation of Figure 1
The shape of the function q has three patterns. First, if φ + ρ < 1, q(H R * ) for 0 ≤ H R * ≤ H is monotonically decreasing between positive and negative infinity. Hence, equation (9) has a unique solution. Second, if φ + ρ > 1 and H > θ, where 
By combining these results, we can graph H 
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Equation (10) 
